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To the Editor: Since 1975, fed-
eral quarantine regulations (1) have 
restricted nonhuman primate impor-
tation to scientific, educational, or 
exhibition purposes to limit risks for 
disease introduction (1,2). Infectious 
diseases resulting from importation 
of nonhuman primates need to be pre-
vented to ensure that colonies of these 
animals are available for research and 
to protect persons working with them 
from exposure to established and 
emerging zoonotic diseases (2,3).
Most imported nonhuman pri-
mates are bred for research and under-
go standard screening and conditioning 
before shipment, which substantially 
reduce importation-associated health 
risks (4). However, many zoonotic 
agents can be difficult to exclude from 
even meticulously controlled breeding 
facilities (3,5). Nonhuman primates are 
commonly imported from regions with 
a high prevalence of potentially zoo-
notic diseases, such as tuberculosis and 
meliodosis, in humans and animals. 
Diagnosing tuberculosis in nonhuman 
primates can be difficult; inadvertent 
colony and human exposures can oc-
cur through undiagnosed cases (6). 
Similarly, Burkholderia pseudomal-
lei, the causative agent of meliodosis, 
can be carried asymptomatically for 
extended periods before illness onset, 
posing a persistent exposure risk for 
persons working with imported nonhu-
man primates from regions to which 
meliodosis is endemic (7). Finally, non-
human primates are host to potentially 
zoonotic viruses, such as simian foamy 
virus, which has unknown pathogenic 
potential in infected persons (8), and 
Macacine herpesvirus 1, which causes 
severe, often fatal, neurologic disease 
in humans exposed to macaques with 
asymptomatic infection (9).
Quarantine and testing of imported 
nonhuman primates, rigorous hygiene 
at research facilities, and strict personal 
protection equipment (PPE) standards 
are important to protect the health of 
nonhuman primate colonies and per-
sons working with the animals (4). Im-
porters must register with the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) and implement disease control 
measures, including a 31-day quaran-
tine for newly arrived animals (1). Spe-
cific PPE is mandated for quarantine 
facility staff, but individual facilities 
determine PPE standards after the ani-
mals are released from CDC-mandated 
quarantine (4).
To better understand occupational 
health and safety practices at facili-
ties housing nonhuman primates, in 
December 2012, the Association of 
Primate Veterinarians, with technical 
support from CDC, surveyed primate 
veterinarians in North America about 
animal handling practices and PPE 
standards at their institutions. The 
Association of Primate Veterinarians 
received completed surveys and re-
moved identifying information before 
providing data to CDC for analysis.
CDC and the University of Guelph 
(Guelph, ON, Canada) determined 
that the survey did not qualify as hu-
man subjects research. Information 
collected applied to the institution, not 
the individual respondent. Respon-
dents were informed that participation 
was voluntary and anonymous, refusal 
carried no repercussions, and results 
would be presented in aggregate.
Of 149 facilities, 7 (5%) indi-
cated they were not currently housing 
nonhuman primates, and 26 (17%) 
provided completed surveys. Most 
responding facilities were university 
or private/contract research facilities 
(16 [62%] and 5 [19%] facilities, re-
spectively). Most (18 [69%]) facilities 
maintained <500 nonhuman primates, 
primarily rhesus or cynomolgus ma-
caques. Nineteen (73%) facilities 
acquired imported nonhuman primates 
during 2010–2012. During this period, 
47,876 nonhuman primates were im-
ported, of which 90% were cynomol-
gus macaques. Fewer nonhuman pri-
mates were acquired from domestic 
sources (1,877 animals; see also [10]).
In a free-text field, we asked 
about quarantine and testing policies 
for newly acquired nonhuman pri-
mates. Most facilities reported apply-
ing standard health requirements to 
newly acquired animals, regardless of 
source, and requiring additional quar-
antine periods before moving new 
animals into the facility population or 
assigning them to a study.
The number of staff working near 
nonhuman primates differed among 
facilities. Ten (38%) facilities reported 
that >30 staff members handle or work 
in close proximity to nonhuman pri-
mates for cleaning or observation each 
day (Table). All facilities required PPE 
for routine handling of animals, includ-
ing use of surgical masks or N95 respira-
tors; goggles, safety glasses, or full-face 
shields; specialized clothing (e.g., labo-
ratory coat, scrubs, or coveralls); gloves; 
and either shoe covers, reusable boots, 
or facility-designated shoes (Table).
Twenty-one (81%) facilities re-
ported routinely handling conscious 
nonhuman primates by using special-
ized safety equipment (e.g., pole and 
collar or restraint chair). Four (15%) 
facilities reported manually capturing 
conscious animals (“hand-catching”); 
2 (8%) facilities performed intrapalpe-
bral tuberculin skin tests on conscious 
animals (Table).
All facilities reported routinely 
performing postmortem examinations. 
Five facilities specified that complete 
necropsies were performed only on 
animals found dead or euthanized be-
cause of illness or injury; for animals 
euthanized at study completion, tar-
geted tissue specimens were collected 
to fulfill research objectives (Table).
These results suggest that respond-
ing facilities generally maintained high 
standards for health and safety and 
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are aware of disease risks. However, 
this survey has limitations for assess-
ing the effectiveness of risk mitigation 
policies. Although a variety of facili-
ties responded, response biases can-
not be excluded. Additionally, these 
results summarize occupational health 
and safety standards on record but can-
not address compliance or employee 
attitudes toward health and safety 
concerns in working with nonhuman 
primates. Facilities maintaining nonhu-
man primates need to strive for strict 
enforcement of occupational health and 
safety requirements; consider requiring 
regular continuing education about hu-
man health risks associated with work-
ing closely with animals; and consider 
the degree of risk pertaining to specific 
activities, particularly those generating 
infectious aerosols.
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 1–5 8	(31) 
 6–10 3	(12) 
 11–15 1	 (4) 
 16–20 3	(12) 
 21–30 1	(4) 
 >30 10	(38) 
Required	personal	protection	equipment*  
 Respiratory	protection	used  
  Surgical	mask 21	(81) 
  N95	respirator 8	(31) 
  Powered	air-purifying	respirator 4	(15) 
 Eye	protection  
  Goggles/safety	glasses 19	(73) 
  Full	face	shield 24	(92) 
 Protective	clothing  
  Laboratory	coat/scrubs 17	(65) 
  Reusable	coveralls 7 (27) 
  Disposable	coveralls 15	(58) 
  Head	covering/cap/bonnet† 8	(31) 
  Extra	gown	layer/arm	covers† 5	(19) 
 Gloves  
  Latex	or	nitrile	gloves 26	(100) 
  Double	gloves† 4	(15) 
  Leather	gloves† 2	(8) 
 Footwear  
  Shoe	covers 24	(92) 
  Reusable	boots 10	(38) 
  Shoes	designated	for	use	in	facility	only† 6	(23) 
Handling	of	animals  




 Conduct	tuberculin	skin	tests	on	conscious	animals 2	(8) 
 Routinely	conduct	necropsy	on	nonhuman	primates	that	die	




†This answer choice was not one provided in the answer options but was provided in the associated 
free-text field for “other.” The number provided reflects the number of respondents who volunteered 
this answer under “other.” 
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